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The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important
types of attacks: the collective attacks and the joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a modified BB84
protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing is done in both the z and the x bases,
against collective attacks. The proof follows the framework of a previous paper [1], but it avoids the classical
information-theoretical analysis that caused problems with composability. We show that this modified BB84
protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that it requires more bits for
testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols take advantage
of the laws of quantum mechanics, and most of them can be
proven secure even against powerful adversaries limited only
by the laws of physics. The two parties (Alice and Bob) want
to create a shared random key, using an insecure quantum
channel and an unjammable classical channel (to which the
adversary may listen, but not interfere). The adversary (eaves-
dropper), Eve, tries to get as much information as she can on
the final shared key. The first and most important QKD proto-
col is BB84 [2].
Boyer, Gelles, and Mor [1] discussed the security of the
BB84 protocol against collective attacks. Collective at-
tacks [3–5] are a subclass of the joint attacks; joint attacks
are the most powerful theoretical attacks. [1] improved the
security proof of Biham, Boyer, Brassard, van de Graaf, and
Mor [5] against collective attacks, by using some techniques
of Biham, Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury [6] (that
proved security against joint attacks). In this paper, too, we
restrict the analysis to collective attacks, because security
against collective attacks is conjectured (and, in some security
notions, proved [7, 8]) to imply security against joint attacks.
In addition, proving security against collective attacks is much
simpler than proving security against joint attacks.
In many QKD protocols, including BB84, Alice and Bob
exchange several types of bits (encoded as quantum systems,
usually qubits): INFO bits, that are secret bits shared by Alice
and Bob and are used for generating the final key (via classical
processes of error correction and privacy amplification); and
TEST bits, that are publicly exposed by Alice and Bob (by
using the classical channel) and are used for estimating the
error rate. In BB84, each bit is sent from Alice to Bob in a
random basis (the z basis or the x basis).
In this paper, we extend the analysis of BB84 done in [1]
and prove the security of a QKD protocol we shall name
BB84-INFO-z. This protocol is almost identical to BB84, ex-
cept that all its INFO bits are in the z basis. In other words,
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the x basis is used only for testing. The bits are thus parti-
tioned into three disjoint sets: INFO, TEST-Z, and TEST-X.
The sizes of these sets are arbitrary (n INFO bits, nz TEST-Z
bits, and nx TEST-X bits).
We note that, while this paper follows a line of research
that mainly discusses a specific approach of security proof for
BB84 and similar protocols (this approach, notably, consid-
ers finite-key effects and not only the asymptotic error rate),
many other approaches have also been suggested: see for ex-
ample [7, 9–11].
In contrast to the line of research adopted here (of [1, 3–6]),
in which a classical information-theoretical analysis caused
problems with composability (see definition in [7]), in this pa-
per we suggest a method to avoid those problems: we calcu-
late the trace distance between any two density matrices Eve
may hold, instead of calculating the classical mutual informa-
tion between Eve and the final key (as done in those previous
papers). This method is implemented in this paper for the
proof of BB84-INFO-z; it also directly applies to the BB84
security proof in [1], and it may be extended in the future to
show that the BB84 security proofs of [1], [5], and [6] prove
the composable security of BB84.
The “qubit space”, H2, is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space.
The states |00〉, |10〉 form an orthonormal basis ofH2, called
“the computational basis” or “the z basis”. The states |01〉 ,
1√
2
[|00〉+ |10〉] and |11〉 , 1√
2
[|00〉 − |10〉] form another or-
thonormal basis ofH2, called “the x basis”. Those two bases
are said to be conjugate bases.
In this paper, bit strings of some length t are denoted by
a bold letter (e.g., i = i1 . . . it with i1, . . . , it ∈ {0,1}) and are
identified to elements of the t-dimensional F2-vector space Ft2,
where F2 = {0,1} and the addition of two vectors corresponds
to a XOR operation. The number of 1-bits in a bit string s is
denoted by |s|, and the Hamming distance between two strings
s and s′ is dH(s,s′) = |s+ s′|.
II. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BB84-INFO-z
PROTOCOL
Below we describe the BB84-INFO-z protocol used in this
paper.
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21. Alice and Bob pre-agree on numbers n, nz, and nx (we
denote N , n+ nz + nx), on error thresholds pa,z and
pa,x, on a linear error-correcting code C with an r× n
parity check matrix PC, and on a linear key-generation
function (privacy amplification) represented by an m×n
matrix PK . It is required that all the r+m rows of the
matrices PC and PK put together are linearly indepen-
dent.
2. Alice randomly chooses a partitionP = (s,z,b) of the
N bits by randomly choosing three N-bit strings s,z,b∈
FN2 that satisfy |s| = n, |z| = nz, |b| = nx, and |s+ z+
b|=N.P thus partitions the set of indexes {1,2, ...,N}
into three disjoint sets:
• I (INFO bits, where s j = 1) of size n;
• TZ (TEST-Z bits, where z j = 1) of size nz; and
• TX (TEST-X bits, where b j = 1) of size nx.
3. Alice randomly chooses an N-bit string i ∈ FN2 , and
sends the N qubit states |ib11 〉, |ib22 〉, . . . , |ibNN 〉, one after
the other, to Bob using the quantum channel. Notice
that the INFO and TEST-Z bits are encoded in the z ba-
sis, while the TEST-X bits are encoded in the x basis.
Bob keeps each received qubit in quantum memory, not
measuring it yet [12].
4. Alice publicly sends to Bob the string b= b1 · · ·bN . Bob
measures each saved qubit in the correct basis (namely,
if bi = 0 then he measures the i-th qubit in the z basis,
and if bi = 1 then he measures it in the x basis).
The bit string measured by Bob is denoted by iB. If
there is no noise and no eavesdropping, then iB = i.
5. Alice publicly sends to Bob the string s. The INFO bits,
used for generating the final key, are the n bits with s j =
1, while the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits are the nz + nx
bits with s j = 0. The substrings of i,b that correspond
to the INFO bits are denoted by is and bs.
6. Alice and Bob both publish their values of all the TEST-
Z and TEST-X bits, and compare the bit values. If more
than nz · pa,z of the TEST-Z bits are different between
Alice and Bob or more than nx · pa,x of the TEST-X bits
are different between them, they abort the protocol. We
note that pa,z and pa,x (the pre-agreed error thresholds)
are the maximal allowed error rates on the TEST-Z and
TEST-X bits, respectively – namely, in each basis (z and
x) separately.
7. Alice and Bob keep the values of the remaining n bits
(the INFO bits, with s j = 1) secret. The bit string of Al-
ice is denoted x= is, and the bit string of Bob is denoted
xB.
8. Alice sends to Bob the r-bit string ξ = xPTC , that is
called the syndrome of x (with respect to the error-
correcting code C and to its corresponding parity check
matrix PC). By using ξ , Bob corrects the errors in his
xB string (so that it is the same as x).
9. Alice and Bob compute the m-bit final key k = xPTK .
The protocol is defined similarly to BB84 (and to its de-
scription in [1]), except that it uses the generalized bit num-
bers n, nz, and nx (numbers of INFO, TEST-Z, and TEST-X
bits, respectively); that it uses the partition P = (s,z,b) for
dividing the N-bit string i into three disjoint sets of indexes (I,
TZ , and TX ); and that it uses two separate thresholds (pa,z and
pa,x) instead of one (pa).
III. SECURITY PROOF OF BB84-INFO-Z AGAINST
COLLECTIVE ATTACKS
A. Results from [1]
The security proof of BB84-INFO-z against collective at-
tacks is very similar to the security proof of BB84 itself
against collective attacks, that was detailed in [1]. Most parts
of the proof are not affected at all by the changes made to
BB84 to get the BB84-INFO-z protocol (changes detailed in
Section II of the current paper), because those parts assume
fixed strings s and b, and because the attack is collective (so
the analysis is restricted to the INFO bits).
Therefore, the reader is referred to the proof in Section 2
and Subsections 3.1 to 3.5 of [1], that applies to BB84-INFO-
z without any changes (except changing the total number of
bits, 2n, to N, which does not affect the proof at all), and that
will not be repeated here.
We denote the rows of the error-correction parity check ma-
trix PC as the vectors v1, . . . ,vr in Fn2, and the rows of the pri-
vacy amplification matrix PK as the vectors vr+1, . . . ,vr+m. We
also define, for every r′, Vr′ , Span{v1, ...,vr′}; and we define
dr,m , min
r≤r′<r+m
dH(vr′+1,Vr′) = min
r≤r′<r+m
dr′,1. (1)
For a 1-bit final key k ∈ {0,1}, we define ρ̂k to be the state
of Eve corresponding to the final key k, given that she knows
ξ . Thus,
ρ̂k =
1
2n−r−1 ∑
x
∣∣ xPTC = ξ
x · vr+1 = k
ρb
′
x , (2)
where ρb′x is Eve’s state after the attack, given that Alice sent
the INFO bits x encoded in the bases b′ = bs. We also defined
in [1] the state ρ˜k, that is a lift-up of ρ̂k (which means that ρ̂k
is a partial trace of ρ˜k).
In the end of Subsection 3.5 of [1], it was found that (in the
case of a 1-bit final key, i.e., m = 1)
1
2
tr |ρ˜0− ρ˜1| ≤ 2
√
P
[
|CI | ≥ dr,12 | BI = b
′,s
]
, (3)
where CI is the random variable corresponding to the n-bit
string of errors on the n INFO bits; BI is the random variable
corresponding to the n-bit string of bases of the n INFO bits;
b′ is the bit-flipped string of b′ = bs; and dr,1 (and, in general,
dr,m) was defined above.
3Now, according to [13, Theorem 9.2 and page 407], and
using the fact that ρ̂k is a partial trace of ρ˜k, we find that
1
2 tr |ρ̂0− ρ̂1| ≤ 12 tr |ρ˜0− ρ˜1|. From this result and from in-
equality (3) we deduce that
1
2
tr |ρ̂0− ρ̂1| ≤ 2
√
P
[
|CI | ≥ dr,12 | BI = b
′,s
]
. (4)
B. Bounding the Differences Between Eve’s States
We define c , i+ iB: namely, c is the XOR of the N-bit
string i sent by Alice and of the N-bit string iB measured by
Bob. For each index 1 ≤ l ≤ N, cl = 1 if and only if Bob’s
l-th bit value is different from the l-th bit sent by Alice. The
partition P divides the N bits into n INFO bits, nz TEST-
Z bits, and nx TEST-X bits. The corresponding substrings
of the error string c are cs (the string of errors on the INFO
bits), cz (the string of errors on the TEST-Z bits), and cb (the
string of errors on the TEST-X bits). The random variables
that correspond to cs, cz, and cb are denoted by CI , CTZ , and
CTX , respectively.
We define C˜I to be the random variable corresponding to
the string of errors on the INFO bits if Alice had encoded and
sent the INFO bits in the x basis (instead of the z basis dictated
by the protocol). In those notations, inequality (4) reads as
1
2
tr |ρ̂0− ρ̂1| ≤ 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,12 | P
]
= 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,12 | cz,cb,P
]
, (5)
using the fact that Eve’s attack is collective, so the qubits are
attacked independently, and, therefore, the errors on the INFO
bits are independent of the errors on the TEST-Z and TEST-X
bits (namely, of cz and cb).
As described in [1], inequality (5) was not derived for the
actual attack U =U1⊗ . . .⊗UN applied by Eve, but for a vir-
tual flat attack (that depends on b and therefore could not have
been applied by Eve). That flat attack gives the same states ρ̂0
and ρ̂1 as the original attack U , and gives a lower (or the same)
error rate in the conjugate basis. Therefore, inequality (5) also
holds for the original attack U . This means that, from now on,
all our results apply to the original attack U and not the flat
attack.
So far, we have discussed a 1-bit key. We will now discuss
a general m-bit key k. We define ρ̂k to be the state of Eve
corresponding to the final key k, given that she knows ξ :
ρ̂k =
1
2n−r−m ∑
x
∣∣xPTC = ξ
xPTK = k
ρb
′
x (6)
Proposition 1. For any two m-bit keys k,k′,
1
2
tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ |
≤ 2m
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
. (7)
Proof. We define the key k j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, to consist of the
first j bits of k′ and the last m− j bits of k. This means that
k0 = k, km = k′, and k j−1 differs from k j at most on a single
bit (the j-th bit).
First, we find a bound on 12 tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j |: since k j−1 dif-
fers from k j at most on a single bit (the j-th bit, given by the
formula x · vr+ j), we can use the same proof that gave us in-
equality (5), attaching the other (identical) key bits to ξ of the
original proof; and we find that:
1
2
tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j |
≤ 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ d j2 | cz,cb,P
]
(8)
where we define d j as dH(vr+ j,V ′j), and V ′j ,
Span{v1,v2, . . . ,vr+ j−1,vr+ j+1, . . . ,vr+m}.
Now we notice that d j is the Hamming distance be-
tween vr+ j and some vector in V ′j , which means that d j =
|∑r+mi=1 aivi| with ai ∈ F2 and ar+ j 6= 0. The properties of
Hamming distance assure us that d j is at least dH(vr′+1,Vr′)
for some r ≤ r′ < r + m. Therefore, we find that dr,m =
minr≤r′<r+m dH(vr′+1,Vr′)≤ d j.
The result dr,m ≤ d j implies that if |C˜I | ≥ d j2 then |C˜I | ≥
dr,m
2 . Therefore, inequality (8) implies
1
2
tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j |
≤ 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
. (9)
Now we use the triangle inequality for norms to find
1
2
tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ |
=
1
2
tr |ρ̂k0 − ρ̂km | ≤
m
∑
j=1
1
2
tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j |
≤ 2m
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
. (10)
The value we want to bound is the expected value of dif-
ference between two states of Eve corresponding to two final
keys. However, we should take into account that if the test
fails, no final key is generated, and the difference between all
of Eve’s states becomes 0 for any purpose. We thus define the
random variable ∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′) for any two final keys k,k′:
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb)
,
 12 tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ | if
|cz|
nz
≤ pa,z and |cb|nx ≤ pa,x
0 otherwise
(11)
4We need to bound the expected value 〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉,
that is given by:
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉= ∑
P,ξ ,cz,cb
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb)
· p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (12)
Theorem 2.
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉 ≤ 2m
√
P
[( |C˜I |
n ≥
dr,m
2n
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
(13)
where |C˜I |n is the random variable corresponding to the error
rate on the INFO bits if they had been encoded in the x basis,
|CTZ |
nz
is the random variable corresponding to the error rate
on the TEST-Z bits, and
|CTX |
nx
is the random variable corre-
sponding to the error rate on the TEST-X bits.
Proof. We use the convexity of x2, namely, the fact that for all
{pi}i satisfying pi ≥ 0 and ∑i pi = 1, it holds that (∑i pixi)2 ≤
∑i pix2i . We find that:
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉2
=
[
∑
P,ξ ,cz,cb
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb)
· p(P,ξ ,cz,cb)
]2
(by (12))
≤ ∑
P,ξ ,cz,cb
(
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb)
)2
· p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (by convexity of x2)
= ∑
P,ξ , |cz|nz ≤pa,z,
|cb |
nx ≤pa,x
(
1
2
tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ |
)2
· p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (by (11))
≤4m2 · ∑
P,ξ , |cz|nz ≤pa,z,
|cb |
nx ≤pa,x
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
· p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (by (7))
=4m2 · ∑
P, |cz |nz ≤pa,z,
|cb |
nx ≤pa,x
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
· p(P,cz,cb)
=4m2 ·∑
P
P
[(
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)
|P
]
· p(P)
=4m2 ·P
[(
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
C. Proof of Security
Following [1] and [6], we choose matrices PC and PK such
that the inequality dr,m2n > pa,x + ε is satisfied for some ε (we
will explain in Subsection III E why this is possible). This
means that
P
[( |C˜I |
n ≥
dr,m
2n
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
≤ P
[( |C˜I |
n > pa,x+ ε
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
. (14)
We will now prove the right-hand-side of (14) to be exponen-
tially small in n.
As said earlier, the random variable C˜I corresponds to the
bit string of errors on the INFO bits if they had been encoded
in the x basis. The TEST-X bits are also encoded in the x ba-
sis, and the random variable CTX corresponds to the bit string
of errors on those bits. Therefore, we can treat the selection
of the n INFO bits and of the nx TEST-X bits as a random
sampling (after the numbers n, nz, and nx and the TEST-Z bits
have all already been chosen), and use Hoeffding’s theorem
(that is described in Appendix A of [1]).
Therefore, for each bit string c1 . . .cn+nx that consists of the
errors in the n+nx INFO and TEST-X bits if the INFO bits had
been encoded in the x basis, we apply Hoeffding’s theorem:
namely, we take a sample of size n without replacement from
the population c1, . . . ,cn+nx (this corresponds to the random
selection of the INFO bits and the TEST-X bits, as defined
above, given that the TEST-Z bits have already been chosen).
Let X = |C˜I |n be the average of the sample (this is exactly the
error rate on the INFO bits, assuming, again, the INFO bits
had been encoded in the x basis); and let µ = |C˜I |+|CTX |n+nx be the
expectancy of X (this is exactly the error rate on the INFO bits
and TEST-X bits together). Then
|CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x is equivalent to
(n+nx)µ−nX ≤ nx · pa,x, and, therefore, to n · (X−µ)≥ nx ·
(µ − pa,x). This means that the conditions
( |C˜I |
n > pa,x+ ε
)
and
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)
rewrite to(
X−µ > ε+ pa,x−µ
)
∧
(
n
nx
· (X−µ)≥ µ− pa,x
)
, (15)
which implies
(
1+ nnx
)
(X − µ) > ε , which is equivalent
to X − µ > nxn+nx ε . Using Hoeffding’s theorem (from Ap-
pendix A of [1]), we get:
P
[(
|C˜I |
n
> pa,x+ ε
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
5≤ P
[
X−µ > nx
n+nx
ε
]
≤ e−2
( nx
n+nx
)2
nε2 (16)
In the above discussion, we have actually proved the fol-
lowing Theorem:
Theorem 3. Let us be given δ > 0, R > 0, and, for infinitely
many values of n, a family {vn1, . . . ,vnrn+mn} of linearly inde-
pendent vectors in Fn2 such that δ <
drn ,mn
n and
mn
n ≤ R. Then
for any pa,z, pa,x > 0 and εsec > 0 such that pa,x + εsec ≤ δ2 ,
and for any n,nz,nx > 0 and two mn-bit final keys k,k′, Eve’s
difference between her states corresponding to k and k′ satis-
fies the following bound:
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉 ≤ 2Rne
−
( nx
n+nx
)2
nε2sec (17)
In Subsection III E we explain why this Theorem guaran-
tees security.
We note that the quantity 〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉 bounds the ex-
pected values of the Shannon Distinguishability and of the
mutual information between Eve and the final key, as done
in [1] and [6], which is sufficient for proving non-composable
security; but it also avoids composability problems: Eve is not
required to measure immediately after the protocol ends, but
she is allowed to wait until she gets more information; and
equation (17) bounds the trace distance between any two of
Eve’s possible states.
D. Reliability
Security itself is not sufficient; we also need the key to be
reliable (namely, to be the same for Alice and Bob). This
means that we should make sure that the number of errors on
the INFO bits is less than the maximal number of errors that
can be corrected by the error-correcting code. We demand
that our error-correcting code can correct n(pa,z+ εrel) errors.
Therefore, reliability of the final key with exponentially small
probability of failure is guaranteed by the following inequal-
ity: (as said, CI corresponds to the actual bit string of errors
on the INFO bits in the protocol, when they are encoded in the
z basis)
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa,z+ εrel
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)]
≤ e−2
( nz
n+nz
)2
nε2rel
This inequality is proved by an argument similar to the one
used in Subsection III C: the selection of the INFO bits and
TEST-Z bits is a random partition of n+nz bits into two sub-
sets of sizes n and nz, respectively (assuming that the TEST-X
bits have already been chosen), and thus it corresponds to Ho-
effding’s sampling.
E. Security, Reliability, and Error Rate Threshold
According to Theorem 3 and to the discussion in Subsec-
tion III D, to get both security and reliability we only need
FIG. 1. The secure asymptotic error rates zone (below the curve)
vectors {vn1, . . . ,vnrn+mn} satisfying both the conditions of the
Theorem (distance drn,mn2n >
δ
2 ≥ pa,x + εsec) and the reliabil-
ity condition (the ability to correct n(pa,z+ εrel) errors). Such
families were proven to exist in Appendix E of [6], giving the
bit-rate:
Rsecret ,
m
n
= 1−H2(2pa,x+2εsec)
− H2
(
pa,z+ εrel+
1
n
)
(18)
where H2(x),−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
Note that we use here the error thresholds pa,x for security
and pa,z for reliability. This is possible, because in [6] those
conditions (security and reliability) on the codes are discussed
separately.
To get the asymptotic error rate thresholds, we require
Rsecret > 0, and we get the condition:
H2(2pa,x+2εsec)+H2
(
pa,z+ εrel+
1
n
)
< 1 (19)
The secure asymptotic error rate thresholds zone is shown
in Figure 1 (it is below the curve), assuming that 1n is negligi-
ble. Note the trade-off between the error rates pa,z and pa,x.
Also note that in the case pa,z = pa,x, we get the same thresh-
old as BB84 ([6] and [1]), which is 7.56%.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the security of the BB84-
INFO-z protocol against any collective attack. We have dis-
covered that the results of BB84 hold very similarly for BB84-
INFO-z, with only two exceptions:
1. The error rates must be separately checked to be below
the thresholds pa,z and pa,x for the TEST-Z and TEST-X
bits, respectively, while in BB84 the error rate threshold
pa applies to all the TEST bits together.
62. The exponents of Eve’s information (security) and of
the failure probability of the error-correcting code (reli-
ability) are different than in [1], because different num-
bers of test bits are now allowed (nz and nx are arbi-
trary). This implies that the exponents may decrease
more slowly (or more quickly) as a function of n. How-
ever, if we choose nz = nx = n (thus sending N = 3n
qubits from Alice to Bob), then we get exactly the same
exponents as in [1].
The asymptotic error rate thresholds found in this paper are
more flexible than in BB84, because they allow us to tolerate
a higher threshold for a specific basis (say, the x basis) if we
demand a lower threshold for the other basis (z). If we choose
the same error rate threshold for both bases, then the asymp-
totic bound is 7.56%, exactly the bound found for BB84 in [6]
and [1].
We conclude that even if we change the BB84 protocol to
have INFO bits only in the z basis, this does not harm its se-
curity and reliability (at least against collective attacks). This
does not even change the asymptotic error rate threshold, and
allows more flexibility when choosing the thresholds for both
bases. The only drawbacks of this change are the need to
check the error rate for the two bases separately, and the need
to either send more qubits (3n qubits in total, rather than 2n)
or get a slower exponential decrease of the exponents required
for security and reliability.
We thus find that the feature of BB84, that both bases are
used for information, is not very important for security and
reliability, and that BB84-INFO-z (that lacks this feature) is
almost as useful as BB84. This may have important implica-
tions on the security and reliability of other protocols that also
only use one basis for information qubits, as done in some
two-way protocols.
We also present a better approach for the proof, that uses a
quantum distance between two states rather than the classical
information. In [1], [5], and [6], the classical mutual infor-
mation between Eve’s information (after an optimal measure-
ment) and the final key was calculated (by using the trace dis-
tance between two quantum states); although we should note
that in [1] and [6], the trace distance was used for the proof of
security of a single bit of the final key even when all other bits
are given to Eve, and only the last stages of the proof discussed
bounding the classical mutual information. In the current pa-
per, on the other hand, we use the trace distance between the
two quantum states until the end of the proof, which avoids
composability problems that existed in the previous works.
Therefore, this proof makes a step towards making [1], [5],
and [6] prove composable security of BB84 (namely, security
even if Eve keeps her quantum states until she gets more infor-
mation when Alice and Bob use the key, rather than measuring
them in the end of the protocol). This approach also applies
(similarly) to the BB84 security proof in [1].
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